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Book Reviews
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Proving Years,
1870-1882, Vol. II. By Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1963. Pp. 295, including Index. $5.00.
The recent adoption by the Faculty Council of the University of Maryland Law School of the requirement that all
students must, before graduation, take a course in either
Jurisprudence, Legal Process or International Law reflects
the growing concern that far too many lawyers, busily immersed in a swamp of increasingly complex statutes, regulations and rulings, have little, if any, exposure to a broader
perspective of their profession. This concern cannot be
dismissed as merely the disdainful sneer of the academician
at the harrassed practitioner who, for example, must never
forget that Congress in its psychological wisdom has decreed that a man is considered to own the stock of his
brother for purposes of applying the personal holding company rules but that he is not the owner of his brother's
stock for purposes of applying the stock redemption rules.
Indeed, it is the harrassed practitioner himself who is beginning to become even more vocal than the professor about
the lack of intellectual order in his profession. The chief
difficulty, however, in trying to acquire a "jurisprudential
perspective", for both the student and the lawyer, lies in
the fact that most books on jurisprudence are deadly.
Professor Howe has furnished the antidote. For his
second volume, in what promises to be one of the monumental biographies of this generation, is quite a lot more
than the story of Holmes' life from 1870 to 1882-it is also
the story of the revolution in American jurisprudence, related in a charming manner. No more delightful introduction to the philosophy of law can be found.
Holmes' last fifty years-from 1882-1902, as an Associate
Justice and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, and from 1902-1932 as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States-are
well known. His brilliant dissents in the "economic due
process" cases, in which the Court ruled unconstitutional
legislation creating minimum wages and maximum hours
and abolishing "yellow dog" contracts, have represented for
over twenty years the unanimous views of the Supreme
Court.1 His opinions in the area of free speech have been
"Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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the starting point for many of the recent Supreme Court
opinions on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To laymen he has probably been the best known American judge.
Holmes' pre-judicial years are not so well known. To
most, these years contain but a few vague references to his
father, the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table; his attendance
at Harvard College and Harvard Law School;2 his participation in the Civil War, in which he was thrice wounded, once
almost fatally, and perhaps even to his fleeting encounter
with Abraham Lincoln.3 Yet, the real excitement of those
early years lay in the development and maturation of a
philosophy of law that became the foundation for fifty
years of judicial opinions. His seemingly facile lines such
as "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics", "General propositions do not
decide concrete cases", "To have doubted one's own first
principles is the mark of a civilized man", "With effervescing opinions, as with... champagne, the quickest way to let
them get flat is to let them get exposed to the air", "I at
least go on very comfortably without the belief that I am
in on the ground floor with God or that the cosmos, whether
it wears a beard or not, needs me in order to know itself
... I merely surmise that our last word is probably not the
last word, any more than that of horses or dogs", did not
suddenly spring forth full-blown in his later years. What
Professor Howe has given to us in this book is a definitive
insight into the intellectual development of the foundations
out of which these few lines and hundreds of judicial opinions ultimately sprang.
In 1870, the starting point of this volume, Holmes opened
a law office with his younger brother; he became the coeditor of the American Law Review, which, at the time,
was the most important legal periodical in the United
States; he continued his work as editor of the 12th edition
of Kent's Commentaries, which was the Nineteenth CenI Holmes' initial impression of the law was as follows: "Law, of which
I once doubted, is now my enthusiastic pursuit . . . one good thing about
it is ithat it makes play of what otherwise would be work, e.g. Metaphysics.
Such spongy stuff as Sir William Hamilton, for instance, after a little pile
of Contingent Remainders or Pleading goes down like macaroni. You give
a little suck and pwip!! You've swallowed it and never known it." HOWE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841-1870

(Vol. 1,

1957) 203.
8"On the afternoon of July 11, 1864 . . . Holmes' eye was caught by
the outrageous sight of a tall civilian blandly surveying the battlefield
while bullets smashed into Fort Stevens. In the heat of the moment, Holmes
shouted, 'Get down, you damn fool, before you get shot.' At the moment
when the explosive order came from his lips, Holmes was wholly unaware
of who it was [that he addressed] 'but a sharp look after his exclamation
made him aware'." Id., 168.
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tury lawyer's counterpart of American Jurisprudence,and
he began his service as University Lecturer on Constitutional Law at Harvard College. The term "editor", used in
describing Holmes' duties with the American Law Review
and Kent's Commentaries, was, as Howe shows, a misnomer, and one can only begin to appreciate the full scope
of Holmes' many activities when it is realized that he was
probably the most prolific contributor to the American Law
Review and that his "editorship" of Kent's Commentaries
demanded that he review practically the entire corpus of
the law, both before and after the previous edition.
Howe's picture of Holmes during the 1870's is almost
that of a semi-recluse, whose dedication to the law was a
consuming passion. "The pallor of his face made him a
melancholy sight."4 Howe quotes Mrs. Henry James (the
elder), who described an occasion in the spring of 1873 on
which Holmes dined with the James family:
"His whole life, soul and body, is utterly absorbed in
his last work upon his Kent. He carries about his manuscript in his green bag and never losses sight of it
for a moment. He started to go to Will's room to wash
his hands, but came back for his bag, and when we
went to dinner, Will said, 'Don't you want to take your
bag with you?' He said, 'Yes, I always do so at home'.'
Marriage ostensibly had little effect on his habits. "Two
days before his marriage Holmes was reading Heineccius,
Recitationes in elementa juris civilis, and three weeks after
the event, he had finished Kant's Elements metaphysiques
de la doctrine du droit and had completed the writing of
his second major essay on classification of the law."6
Holmes did manage a brief respite from his labors during
the summer of 1874 when he and his wife visited England
and the Continent. Only during a brief period such as this
did Holmes reveal the qualities of gaiety, romanticism, zest
for living and gifted conversation in which he could not
indulge while devoting all his efforts to the law. Kenneth
Campbell has remarked that when Holmes was in England
he was quite unlike his celebrated friend and fellow Harvard graduate, Henry James, of whom it was said that he
was "just a little too far away to hear what the duchess
was saying." Holmes had the duchess listening to him.
When Holmes and his wife returned to Boston, Holmes,
who by then had completed his work on Kent's ComI HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882
(Vol. 2, 163) 22.
51bid.
6 Id., 9.

1963]

BOOK REVIEWS

mentaries and had relinquished his editorial position on
the American Law Review, plunged into practice by entering the partnership in Shattuck, Holmes, and Monroe. The
rigor of his intellectual endeavors did not, however, cease.
When he was not working on cases for his firm, he was writing a series of essays for the American Law Review.
These essays formed the backbone for the Lowell Lectures on The Common Law which he delivered at the Harvard Law School at the end of 1880 and which were eventually published in March, 1881. Professor Howe's book closes
with Holmes' appointment as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, an appointment
which he accepted only three months after he had assumed
the duties of Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School.
The largest portion of Professor Howe's book is concerned with an analysis of the revolutionary nature of The
Common Law. This slender volume, which has been
through over 45 printings, will surely retain its place as
one of the landmarks of jurisprudence. As Howe puts it,
Holmes "was the first lawyer, English or American, to subject the common law to the analysis of a philosopher and
the explanation of an historian."' The elaborate historical
research of Maitland, Stephen, Thayer and Ames, and the
founding of the Harvard Law Review, the Law Quarterly
Review, and the Selden Society were all events that occurred shortly after the publication of The Common Law.
The philosophical analyses that have dominated jurisprudence since 1881 have, to a large extent, taken many of
their basic premises from The Common Law.
An adequate appreciation of the significance of The
Common Law can only be obtained by a recognition of the
arid state of jurisprudence in the middle of the Nineteenth
Century. The domination of natural law and natural rights
theories, with their insistence on the divine and ethical
sources of law, had easily appealed to the religious colonists
and to framers of the Declaration of Independence. All
men are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights"-it would have been heresy to attack such a doctrine. It was an era when Chief Judge Buchanan of Maryland was able to write in transcendant tones:
"... [T]here is a fundamental principle of right and jus-

tice, inherent in the nature and spirit of the social
compact, (in this country at least) the character and
genius of our government, the causes from which they
sprang, and the purpose for which they were estab' Id., 137.
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lished, that rises above and restrains and sets bounds
to the power of legislation which the legislature cannot
pass without exceeding its rightful authority.""
The influence of such lofty themes of natural law eventually and inevitably began to decline, for several reasons:
the excesses of the French Revolution, which had, at least
philosophically, sought its justification in natural rights
theories; the rise of Utilitarianism, whose leader, Jeremy
Bentham, once wrote, "To maintain that there is a natural
right and to impose it as a limit to positive laws, to say that
law cannot go against natural right, to recognize, in consequence, the right which attacks law, which overturns
and annuls it, is at once to render all government impossible
and to defy reason"9 and the particular need in the United
States, by the middle of the Nineteenth Century, for an
ordering and systematization of the legal materials which
had developed since the founding of the country, especially
in view of the fact that the only scaffolding, other than the
one created by natural law, was based on the intricate
procedural writs, which Bentham, in another of his endeavors, had also destroyed.
One of the philosophies which gained some following in
this atmosphere was "analytical jurisprudence", whose
chief proponent was John Austin. Austin vowed to create
a logically consistent system by describing the law "as it
is" rather than as it "ought to be"; he felt that law "as it
is" could be described merely as the will of the sovereign.
Another was "historical jurisprudence", whose leaders
were Savigny and Maine, who urged that law could only
be understood by tracing its history back to its Roman roots.
Holmes' brilliance, as Professor Howe demonstrates
with great clarity, consisted of his ability to reveal the deficiencies of all of these theories of jurisprudence. Early in
the 1870's, Holmes pointed out that analytical jurists were
erroneously disregarding such forces as tradition and public
opinion. Holmes completely demolished Austin's theory of
a logically self-contained system in a "book notice" which he
wrote for the American Law Review in 1872, which also
foreshadowed Holmes' well known "prediction theory" of
the law:
"The judges have other motives for decision outside
their own arbitrary will, beside the commands of their
'Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 408
(1838).
9I BENTHAM, WORKS (1843) 136.
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sovereign. And whether these other motives are, or
are not, equally compulsory, is immaterial, if they are
sufficiently likely to prevail to afford a ground for prediction. The only question for the lawyer is, how will
the judges act? Any motive for their action, be it constitution, statute, custom, or precedent, which can be
relied upon as likely in the generality of cases to prevail, is worthy of consideration as one of the sources
of law, in a treatise on jurisprudence. Singular motives,
like the blandishments of the emperor's wife, are not
a ground for prediction, and are therefore not considered."'10
Holmes, who had originally been inspired by the analytic faith, found more kinship in the methods of the historian. Many years later he wrote: "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past."" The method of The Common Law was precisely to bare the historical antecedents of the rules which
had become axiomatic in the Nineteenth Century. Howe
traces Holmes' theories in each of the subjects which occupied his attention: torts, criminal law, contracts and possession. Holmes, influenced greatly by his friend, Henry
Adams, revealed that the source of much of our law was
Teutonic, not Roman, as Savigny and Maine had supposed;
by doing so, Holmes was able to demonstrate that the
presuppositions on which many rules of the common law
had been formulated were inapposite.
Holmes' most frequently misunderstood contribution to
jurisprudence was his theory that liability, despite the
language of judicial opinions, was not dependent on moral
culpability, as the natural law theorists would have it, but
on the failure to live up to an external standard. Howe
patiently describes the development of this notion of
Holmes, first in the area of civil liability, then in criminal
liability. The seminal influence of Holmes' theories on the
external standard of liability are, of course, revealed in the
doctrine of the "reasonable man" in the law of torts and in
the repudiation of the contract doctrine often referred to
by that 2 unfortunate expression - "the meeting of the
minds".1
" 6 Am. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1872).

n Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).

"2Supra,n. 4, 233.
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Howe captures the drama of these great shifts in jurisprudential theory-and anyone who can dramatize jurisprudence deserves unrestrained praise. The only dissonant
note which this reviewer found in the book was Howe's
denigration of the influence of pragmatism and its founders
on Holmes' thinking.
The founders of pragmatism, all graduates of Harvard
University, were living in Cambridge in the 1860's. (Indeed,
Charles Darwin once remarked that there were enough
brilliant minds at Harvard in the 1860's to staff all the
universities in England.) Around 1870, Charles Saunders
Peirce, a lecturer in logic and the philosophy of science,
and a man whom Whitehead once called "a very great man
...the essence of [whose] thought was originality in every
subject that he taught", gathered together a group of remarkable young scholars to discuss contemporary intellectual problems. The result of Peirce's efforts was the famous
"Metaphysical Club", which he described about thirty-five
years later in the following passage:
"It was in the earliest 'seventies that a knot of us young
men in Old Cambridge, calling ourselves, half-ironically, half defiantly, 'The Metaphysical Club', for
agnosticism was then riding its high horse, and was
frowning superbly on all metaphysics-used to meet,
sometimes in my study, sometimes in that of William
James. It may be that some of our old-time confederates would today not care to have such wild-oats sowing made public, though there was nothing but boiled
oats, milk and sugar in the mess. Mr. Justice Holmes,
however, will not, I believe, take it ill that we are
proud to remember his membership . . .it was there

name and doctrine of pragmatism saw the
that the
light. '13
13
WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM (1949) 19-20
(emphasis added). In a delightful fragment written on the back of a
letter in 1907, Peirce claimed that "The Metaphysical Club" was "a
name chosen to alienate all whom it would alienate. Its constitution was
equally effective, for it contained in a single clause forbidding any action
by the Club as a collective body, this preventing it from wasting the only
intrinsically precious element in the world, as so many other societies
waste it, in the idle frivolity they call 'business,' which moreover since
without action there could be no officers and in particular no secretary and
so no acknowledged record of debate, to gentlemen desirous of distinguishing themselves or of taking patents as it were upon such ingenious combinations of ideas as they might contrive, an adequate motive was presented to hold their peace and abandon the arena of debate to those who
only sought to draw as near to the truth as they could. It was quite the
most successfully organized body of students I ever had the benefit of
joining-a model worthy of imitation." Id., 21.
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Besides a Harvard degree, all of the members of The
Metaphysical Club had one thing in common-a sense of
the epoch-making importance of Darwin's Origin of Species,
which had been published in 1859. Darwin's thesis, that
the order of species was the result of an evolutionary
process based on the chance variations of individual organisms, involved a repudiation of the notion that the universe,
when it was created, had been completely planned according to a preconceived system. Darwin showed that higher
organisms had evolved as a result of chance variations in
order to meet certain physiological needs which lower organisms were unable to fulfill. The relevance of the Darwinian hypotheses of evolution and the contingencies of
nature is that they were applied by the founders of pragmatism to subjects other than biology to create a new doctrine, generally referred to as "pragmatism".
William James, also a member of The Metaphysical
Club, once wrote:
"He [the pragmatist] turns away from abstractions and
insufficiency from verbal solutions, from bad a priori
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action
and towards power. That means the empiricist temper
regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up.
It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as
against dogma, artificiality, and the pretenses of finality
in truth."' 4
The philosophy of pragmatism summarized in this quotation has been reflected in many ways in Holmes' philosophy of law. The natural law theorists had enshrined
ethical fixed principles and abstractions. The analytic
jurist created a closed system based on logic. For practically all legal philosophies, the law was indeed "a brooding
omnipresence in the sky", and no system of jurisprudence
could attain respect unless it could claim with complete
certainty that it had discovered the "true unchanging law".
Holmes, however, could write that a "certainty generally
is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."'15 Although
"[Tlhe language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic . . . [And] the logical method and form
flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which
is in every human mind... [B]ehind the logical form
14

WILIJAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM

Supra, n. 11, 466.

(1907) 51.
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lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance
of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very
root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give
any conclusion a logical form."'16
In an essay on "Natural Law", Holmes opened as follows:
"It is not enough for the knight of romance that you
agree that his lady is a very nice girl-if you do not
admit that she is the best that God ever made or will
make, you must fight. There is in all men a demand
for the superlative, so much so that the poor devil who
has no other way of reaching it attains it by getting
drunk. It seems to me that this demand is at the bottom
of the philosopher's effort to prove that truth is absolute and of the jurist's search for criteria of universal
validity, which he collects under the head of natural
law."17
Instead of looking for an a priorianswer to legal problems,
Holmes pleaded for the legal philosopher to turn to the
consequences of an idea; his emphasis on the consequences
rather than the antecedents of an idea was also one of the
dominant thoughts originally expressed in The Metaphysical Club, chiefly by Peirce. Holmes' notion of defining contractual obligations, not in terms of the duty of performance, but rather in terms of the risk of non-performance,
furnished a specific illustration of his application of these
pragmatic ideas to the common law. 8 His "clear and present danger" test in the free speech cases is nothing but a
refusal to say that the doctrine of free speech is an absolute
dogma. "The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done... The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic."19 Howe
finds in Holmes' "distrust [in The Common Law] of metaphysical abstractions, whether derived from Kant '2or
from
0
Hegel, a pragmatist's preference for concreteness.
This is not the place to multiply the instances in Holmes'
writings of the pragmatic temper. Suffice it to add that
perhaps the best known passage in American legal philosophy, the opening lines of The Common Law, give further
evidence of Holmes' pragmatism:
20Id.,

465-466.

1732 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1918).

Supra, n. 12, 238.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
10Supra, n. 12, 238.
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"The object of this book is to present a general view
of the Common Law. To accomplish this task, other
tools are needed besides logic. It is something to show
that the consistency of a system requires a particular
result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow
man, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corrollaries of a book of mathematics."'"
Despite the repeated strain of pragmatism in Holmes'
writings, Howe attributes little influence to Charles Peirce,
William James, Nicholas St. John, Chauncey Wright and
the other "members" of The Metaphysical Club. Howe may
perhaps ascribe too much significance to the fact that
Holmes had asserted to Morris Cohen that, as late as
1891, he had not "heard of pragmatism."2 2 The word
"pragmatism" however was probably not used at alland it certainly never appeared in print-until the very
end of the 1890's when William James began to use
it. More to the point are Holmes' recollections of
Chauncey Wright, one of the stellar members of the Club.
In writing to Sir Frederick Pollock, Holmes wrote, "Chauncey Wright, a nearly forgotten philosopher of real merit,
taught me when young that I must not say necessary about
the universe, that we don't know whether anything is necessary or not. '23 To Morris Cohen, Holmes reiterated:
"That we could not assert the necessity of the order of the
2HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881) 1. Howe interestingly points out
that this passage is a paraphrase from a disparaging review which Holmes
had published in American Law Review in 1880 of Dean Langdell's Selection
of Cases on the Law of Contracts, "Mr. Langdell's ideal in the law, the end
of all his striving, is the elegantia juris, or logical integrity of the system
as a system. He is, perhaps, the greatest living legal theologian. But as a
theologian, he is less concerned with his postulates than to show that the
conclusions from them hang together. . . . If Mr. Langdell could be suspected of even having troubled himself about Hegel, we might call him a
Hegelian In disguise, so entirely is he interested in the formal connection
of things, or logic, as distinguished from the feelings which make the content of logic, and which have actually shaped the substance of the law."
Supra, n. 12, 155-157.
2 Supra, n. 12, 75, citing Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 JOURNAL OF
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1948) 3, 19.
212
HoLMEs-PoLLOcK LETTERS (Howe Ed., 1941) 252. (Letter of August
30, 1929.)
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universe I learned to believe from Chauncey Wright. I
suspect C. S. P. [Peirce] got it from the same source."2 Perhaps Professor Howe has not chosen to attempt an illumination of the "influence" of The Metaphysical Club on
Holmes' thinking because there are only very few scraps
of written evidence of the discussions held in the Club,
and Howe has, no doubt, too assiduously attempted to avoid
the fictionalized portrait which Catherine Drinker Bowen
gave of Holmes in Yankee from Olympus.
In any event, this very negligible omission in no way
detracts from the fact that Professor Howe's book shows,
in its analysis of the early development of Holmes' philosophy of law, that, as Holmes himself put it, "a man may
live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; that there as
well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; that there as well as elsewhere he may
wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear himself out after the unattainable."2 5 One
can only hope that, although six years elapsed between the
publication of the first and second volumes of this biography, Professor Howe will be able to present the next
volume, with no loss of charm, before six more years have
passed.
SHALE D. STILLER*

Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice
February 25, 1963. Pp. 154.
At the request of the Attorney General, a distinguished
committee of lawyers, scholars and judges has considered
the impact of poverty on administration of the criminal
code in the federal courts. It has concluded that in several
critical, but correctible, areas the poverty of an accused
places a heavy and unfair weight on the scales of justice.
Based on a two-year nationwide study, with special emphasis on four representative federal districts, the Committee has made far-reaching proposals for reform, some
of which are now before the Congress.
"4Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
(1948) 3, 34-35.
HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, CoLLEovED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 30.
* Partner in Frank, ,Bernstein, Gutberlet & Conaway, Baltimore, Maryland; Lecturer, University of Maryland Law School; B.A., Hamilton College, 1954, LL.B., Yale Law School, 1957.
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"Too little, too late" fairly characterizes the Committee's
evaluation of the existing federal system for providing the
financially handicapped criminal defendant with adequate
means of self-defense. Although the Committee shares the
admiration of many observers for the effective services
often performed by uncompensated court-appointed counsel, it feels that non-compensation sometimes results in the
appointment of inexperienced practitioners to cases demanding more developed skills. The present system also
places "unconscionable burdens" on particular lawyers,
many of whom sustain out-of-pocket losses.1 "More fundamental, however, are the conditions under which assigned
counsel are required to operate, for these limit the effectiveness of the most proficient and experienced lawyers
who participate in the defense of financially disadvantaged
persons."2 Failure to give assigned counsel the resources
with which to litigate may have the "devastating" consequence of inducing guilty pleas or severely handicapping
the conduct of the defense at trial.3 Delay in appointment
of counsel until arraignment in a district court deprives
the accused of advice on whether to waive or insist upon a
preliminary hearing and usually forecloses the opportunity
to bring special circumstances to the attention of the United
States Attorney at the pre-indictment stage.4 Present bail
administration, furthermore, seriously hobbles the person
of inadequate means. He is often deprived of both liberty
and livelihood during the crucial period of pre-trial preparation. And the making of bail may itself entail the commitment of financial resources essential for preparation of
the defense. "Moneys urgently required to establish the
defendant's case are thereby diverted to the purchase of
pre-trial liberty." 5 The poor, in short, get poorer.
The Committee recommends legislation, now the substance of the proposed Criminal Justice Act of 1963 and
currently under study by and on the floor of Congress,
delegating to each judicial district the authority, with
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, to devise a
plan of adequate representation utilizing some or all of the
following options: 1. Compensation of court-appointed
counsel at a rate not to exceed $15.00 an hour and reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred; 2. Establishment of a full or part-time federal public defender, to be
'Report, 29.
2

Id., 26.

'Id., 26.
'Id., 24-25.
'Id., 70.
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appointed for four years by the judicial council and empowered to hire assistants and an investigative staff; 3.
Compensation and reimbursement to legal aid societies, bar
association groups and private defender organizations
which furnish attorneys pursuant to the chosen plan. The
Committee recommends, and the pending legislation provides, that an accused is to be advised of his right to counsel,
or to court-appointed counsel if he is financially unable to
obtain counsel, at his first appearance before a United States
commissioner or district judge. Each district's plan is also
to provide for furnishing investigative, expert or other
services to impoverished defendants.
Other recommendations of the Committee are designed
to free the financially-handicapped accused from the inequities of bail administration. It recommends more frequent release of defendants on their own recognizance, a
system of supervision of persons at liberty pending trial,
and authorization for bail-setting officials to accept as security cash or other property less than the bail amount,
to be returned to the accused upon his performance of the
bail obligation.
On a broader plane, the report adds to the growing literature of bench and bar a critical, eloquent return to fundamentals.' The problem of poverty is not a matter of public
charity or noblesse oblige; nor is it solely an issue of inequity and unfairness to an individual accused. At stake
is the viability of the adversary system and the effective
challenging of official decision which lies at its heart. The
government's obligation to act, furthermore, does not "presuppose a general commitment on the part of the federal
government to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of limited means wherever or however manifested." Poverty of the accused is irrelevant to and often
impedes the just administration of the criminal law. In a
process initiated by government, therefore, which has as
its object the imposition of severe sanctions on the accused,
government "may properly be required to minimize the
influence of poverty on its administration of justice."'
STEPHEN
6

H. SACHS*

Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 579 (1963).

7 Id., 9.

*B.A., Haverford College, 1954; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1960; Assistant
United States Attorney. Mr. Sachs writes in his private capacity and not
as a spokesman for the Department of Justice.

